THE KABUL CORRIDOR: A NEW BRIDGE BETWEEN CENTRAL & SOUTH ASIA

Q1) How would you assess the present state of connectivity between Central Asia and South Asia? What do you think are the most significant gaps or missed opportunities so far?

N.U. Despite their geographic proximity and the potential to establish efficient overland trade logistics, Central and South Asia are the least interconnected subregions. Currently, our markets are primarily connected by sea routes, which are much less efficient than land-based trade routes. The complexity and cost of transport accessibility are among the main constraints on interregional trade growth.

In a joint report published in 2023 with the Export-Import Bank of India, the Eurasian Development Bank estimated India’s untapped trade potential with Central Asian countries to be worth $1.9 billion — double the actual average trade volume between the countries over the past five years.

Uzbekistan is the main destination for Indian exports in the region. In 2025, the value of bilateral trade had exceeded $1.3 billion, with steady growth being maintained. Nevertheless, India’s share of our country’s foreign trade remains modest, primarily due to logistical challenges.

For geopolitical reasons — specifically, to avoid dependence on Pakistan for land transport links to Central Asia — New Delhi relies on Iranian transit. In 2016, India signed a trilateral agreement with Iran and Afghanistan to establish a multimodal transport corridor through the Iranian port of Chabahar on the Indian Ocean,  as well as an Iranian-Afghan transport network towards Central Asia. In May 2024, India signed a long-term contract with Iran, allocating a further $120 million for the modernization of Chabahar Port, in addition to the $500 million already invested.

At the same time, India, in partnership with Russia, is developing the North-South At the same time, India is developing the International North-South  Transport Corridor (INSTC) in partnership with Russia. This project also relies on Iran's transport infrastructure to connect with the Hindustan Peninsula.

In 2022, Tashkent announced plans to launch the the Uzbekistan-Turkmenistan-Iran-India transport corridor, utilising the port of Chabahar, after the 2011 Ashbahad Agreement was resumed.

However, the military escalation in the Persian Gulf poses a serious risk to the effective operation of trans-Iranian trade routes between India and Central Eurasia. This is in addition to the existing physical barriers, such as differences in technical standards, a shortage of logistics infrastructure or rolling stock, and non-physical barriers, such as different transit tariffs and customs clearance regulations and the low digitalization of the shipping process, that make organizing interregional deliveries difficult.

Q2) What are the key structural regional connectivity challenges between Central Asia and South Asia, according to you? And how are regional states like Uzbekistan responding, particularly after the leadership change in 2016? 

N.U. Following a change in political leadership, Uzbekistan has revised its foreign policy to focus on achieving geo-economic goals and objectives. This primarily involves expanding the geography of exports due to intensified market reforms and dynamic economic growth, which is inextricably linked to creating efficient and reliable trade routes to global markets and developing transit potential.

In my opinion, one of the fundamental problems with connectivity between Central and South Asia is the weak integration of roads and railways of these regions. They are located in different transport spaces with different technical and technological standards, transport legislation and economic regulations. This includes differences in railroad track gauges, freight wagon sizes, border and customs control procedures, shipping document regulations, and many other aspects. This significantly complicates the movement of freight across borders, impacting the efficiency of transport corridors and hindering the development of seamless logistics.

Uzbekistan proposed the creation of a unified SCO transport space as a solution. The initiative was announced at last year’s Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit in Tianjin, China. In order to coordinate this multi-layered process, the plan is to establish a Council for the Integration of Railway Spaces of SCO Countries, which will be headquartered in Tashkent.

Q3) Where do you place Afghanistan between Central Asia and South Asia for regional connectivity? What has been the shift in Afghanistan’s relevance as a connectivity linchpin between the two regions since the Taliban’s takeover in August 2021? 

N.U. Throughout its period of independence, Uzbekistan has pursued a consistent policy of diversifying foreign trade flows, increasing efficiency, and reducing the cost of trade logistics due to the country’s doubly difficult geographic location in terms of its remoteness from open seas. Expanding the republic's transit capacity has also been a priority, as it is seen as a driver of economic growth through increased exports of transport services. In this context, the development of the southern transit route is a priority, with Afghanistan, Iran and Pakistan being key partners.

Iran has long provided Central Asian countries with an alternative route to the ocean. In 1996, the Tejen-Sarakhs-Mashhad railway was launched and was subsequently extended to the Iranian port of Bandar Abbas. In 2016, the Ashgabat Agreement came into force, establishing a multimodal trade route via the Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Iran and the Indian Ocean to Oman. Thus, for the first time, transport connectivity was established between Central Asia and the Persian Gulf region. Iran also facilitates land connections between Central Asia and the European Union via Türkiye. Since 2023, Uzbekistan has been actively participating in the formation of the Southern Railway Corridor along the east-west axis through Central Asia, Iran and Türkiye. This project is supported by the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE). 

The second branch of the southern transit route under consideration is the Trans-Afghan Railway, which runs along the Termez–Naibabad–Maidanshahr–Logar–Kharlachi route and is also known as the Kabul Corridor. Proposed by Uzbekistan in 2018, the project is intended as an alternative North-South transport and transit corridor. Not only will the Kabul Corridor provide the shortest land connection between Central Asia and the Indian subcontinent, it will also connect economic hubs such as the EU, China, Russia and India. The Uzbekistan–Afghanistan–Pakistan (UAP) railway corridor’s main freight base, with a projected volume of up to 22 million tons per year, will be generated by cargo from these countries and regions. According to preliminary estimates, the new transit route through Central Asia and Afghanistan will be 1,200 kilometers shorter than the INSTC through Iran, which will be one of its main competitive advantages.

Following their takeover of power in Afghanistan, the Taliban promptly began dialogue with Tashkent regarding the implementation of the Kabul Corridor project. In 2023, a project office was opened in Tashkent to coordinate further work on the project with branches in Kabul and Islamabad. On July 17, 2025, the parties signed an intergovernmental framework agreement to prepare a feasibility study for the Trans-Afghan Railway, and engineering research will soon begin in Afghanistan.

Q4) How do the interests of external powers - such as China, Russia and the United States – shape or constrain the prospects of Central Asian-South Asian connectivity? Do you see their roles as complementary or competing?

N.U. The formation of the Trans-Afghan Railway Corridor does not currently conflict with the interests of the major powers you listed. 

As part of its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), China is developing the $60 billion China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). The first phase of the project involved modernizing Pakistan’s transport infrastructure, including its seaports. The Kabul Corridor extends to the Afghan-Pakistan border at Kharlachi, suggesting the potential for it to be linked to the CPEC. Cargo transported via the Trans-Afghan Railway will partly be oriented towards further transport by sea. This would enable additional cargo to be loaded onto Pakistani ports, increasing their profitability and capitalizing on investment.

Beijing is also interested in Afghanistan joining the BRI, which would pave the way for Chinese investment in developing trans-Afghan trade routes. Furthermore, the construction of a railway through Afghanistan would create a land bridge between China and India, despite their political differences, as the two countries maintain close trade relations.

Having lost a significant share of the premium European market due to international sanctions, Russia continues to redirect its exports to South Asia, particularly India. This has increased Moscow’s interest in new trade routes through Afghanistan. Russia is participating in the development of the 5,532-kilometer Belarus–Russia–Kazakhstan–Uzbekistan–Afghanistan–Pakistan multimodal transport corridor.

From an American strategic perspective in Central Asia, developing alternative trade routes southwards does not conflict with US interests, as it provides an opportunity to reduce the regional countries’ dependence on Russia for transit. Furthermore, Washington may consider the Trans-Afghan Corridor in the context of creating transport access to Central Asia’s rich natural resources, including rare earth metals, in addition to the Middle Corridor. 

Q5) How do you see India’s potential participation in the North-South transport and transit corridor through Afghanistan? What are the specific routes or projects that you identify as suitable and feasible for India to join?

N.U. The most accessible overland trade and logistics routes between India and Central Asia run through Iran. Compared to maritime routes via Europe or China, transporting goods via Iran is almost a third cheaper and quicker. However, as I have already mentioned, the transit corridor through Afghanistan to South Asia will be more than 1,000 km shorter than the INSTC, according to preliminary estimates. This presents a unique opportunity for India, with its population of 1.4 billion, to gain the shortest possible access to Eurasian markets and establish the relatively rapid transportation of raw materials needed by its economy from the region.

Given the ongoing geopolitical tensions in the Middle East, which are restricting the operation of Iran’s southern seaports, I believe India should consider the Termez–Naibabad–Maidanshahr–Logar–Kharlachi railway as a viable alternative for transport links with Central Asia. The project involves three countries: Uzbekistan, Afghanistan and Pakistan, two of which are currently experiencing an escalation in border conflict. Nevertheless, none of the parties has withdrawn from the project. As its main initiator, Uzbekistan adheres to the logic of overcoming conflicts by fostering economic interdependence through large-scale cross-border projects that serve the interests of all countries involved. This approach was emphasized during the second Termez Dialogue on Connectivity between Central and South Asia, which was recently held in Tashkent.

Q6) What are your views on the implications of the latest round of Afghanistan-Pakistan border clashes on the prospects of Central Asia-South Asia connectivity? 

N.U. Among the countries of Central Asia, Uzbekistan is the leading country for freight transport to Pakistan, with a regional share exceeding 60 percent. Afghanistan is the main transit hub. However, large-scale clashes on the Afghan–Pakistani border have halted the flow of freight south through Afghanistan. Uzbekistan is therefore considering alternative road routes for trade with Pakistan, such as through Iran (the Mirjaveh-Taftan border crossing), or through China via the Karakoram Highway. Rerouting freight traffic always incurs additional costs and requires long organizational work.